Last updated: November 2022
Abstract: How do we assign values to virtual items? In this paper I offer a framework for answering this question. While virtual monism maintains that virtual Xs belong to only one value-salient kind in relation to X, virtual pluralism maintains that virtual Xs belong to more than one kind. I argue that virtual monism is mistaken, and dualistic virtual pluralism is too coarse-grained. In place I argue for a four-fold pluralism. I apply the view to various debates in the literature, and conclude with a discussion of less basic hybrid kinds.
Abstract: I argue that depending on how we understand two key ideas in Morgan Luck’s (2009) formulation of the gamer’s dilemma, the dilemma results in one of three distinct dilemmas. One dilemma focuses on the permissibility of game acts. Another focuses on the permissibility of represented acts. And a final dilemma focuses of the permissibility of partially reproduced acts.
Abstract: It is typically assumed that hallucinations are not cases of perception. In this paper I argue that three central observations thought to support this view all fail to do so. This paves the way for adopting a hallucinatory perception theory, on which all hallucinations are hallucinatory perceptions, hallucinations that are a type of perception.
Abstract: Morgan Luck’s (2009) gamer’s dilemma maintains that virtual murder and virtual molestation in videogames are not morally different. So we should either accept or reject both acts. I argue for a dissolution of the dilemma by rejecting that all instances of virtual murder are morally permissible, and that all instances of virtual molestation are morally impermissible. I do this by arguing that the in-game context plays a morally-salient role in our evaluation of acts like virtual murder and molestation.
Ali, Rami. (in progress) What in the world are hallucinations?, Masrour, F. & Beck, O. (Eds) New Waves in Relationalism (tentative title). Routledge. Please email me for a copy.
Abstract: If in defending naive realism one accepts a hallucinatory perception theory, then one is confronted with two puzzles about the phenomenal character of hallucinations. In this paper I answer these two puzzles by argue that naive realists should reject diaphaneity, and model hallucinatory perception on picture perception.
Ali, Rami. (in progress). How is perception phenomenally particular? Brogaard, B., French, R., & Bueno, O. (eds.). The Roles of Representation in Visual Perception. Synthese Library. Please email me for a copy.
Abstract: Proponents of the phenomenal particularity thesis typically maintain that experiences with different particulars differ phenomenally. I argue that this is a mistake. In some cases experiences can be phenomenally identical even if the particulars that constitute them differ, because not all differences in particulars show up phenomenally. Moreover, this view is not in tension with naive realism.
Ali, Rami. (2018). Malik’s The Systems of Whitehead’s Metaphysics (Chapter 7). On the Philosophical Thought of Charles Malik Vol. I: Whitehead, Reason, and Spirit. NDU Press, Lebanon.
Abstract: I offer a broad overview of the relationship between Charles Malik’s views and views in Analytic philosophy, Phenomenology, and contemporary philosophy, while also covering some of the beginning chapters of Malik’s book on Whitehead’s metaphysics.
“Naive Realism and Hallucinatory Perception”, New Waves in Relationalism (May 2021), University of Wisconsin-Madison.
“What in the World are Hallucinations?” presented at the Philosophy of Language & Mind 5, St. Andrews University (Aug 2019), European Society for Philosophy & Psychology (Sep 2019), the University of Glasgow’s Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience Research Seminar (Dec 2019).
“Is all Virtual Reality Equally Real?”, Distributed Interactive Systems lab, Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica, Netherlands (June 2018)
“Agency, Dissimulation, and Social Perception” presented at the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division (March 2018).
“Do Visual Hallucinations Involve Perception?” presented at the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division (January 2018). See a video of this talk.
“Is All Virtual Reality Equally Real or Unreal?” presented at the Phenomenology and Virtuality Conference, Husserl Archives, KU Leuven (May 2017).
“Direct Social Perception and Dissimulation” presented at the ‘Empathy, Direct Perception and Other Minds’ Spring School, Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen (March 2017).
“Living With Others: Four Basic Concepts from Phenomenology” presented at the American University of Beirut (February 2017).
“The Illusionist View of Hallucinations” presented at the Normativity Workshop, New York University Abu Dhabi (February 2016).
“A New Solution to the Gamer’s Dilemma” presented at the 8th Philosophy of Computer Games Conference – Freedom in Play, Bilgi University (November 2014).
“Misperception and its Impact on Theories of Perceptual Experience” presented at the Association for the Study of the Mind in the Middle East and Africa Region, American University of Beirut, (June 2013).
“Crosscutting Kinds and Consilience in Emotion Theory” presented at the Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Mind: The Place of Emotions in the Cognitive Sciences, University of Toronto (March 2010)